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Abstract In this chapter, we examine statements of Finnish municipal election can-
didates regarding plans to build a “grand mosque” and cultural centre in central
Helsinki. Despite proclaiming support for the universal freedom of religion, the can-
didates were hesitant to apply it to themosque case. Opponents of themosque project
emphasized the Christian heritage of Finland and portrayed the proposedmosque as a
channel throughwhich foreign conflicts could enter Finnish society. Themosquewas
also opposed because it was seen as a “political” project instead of a “religious” one.
The proponents of the mosque, in turn, considered it to be a “Muslim church” and
therefore entitled to the same treatment as Christian houses of worship. The mosque
was also seen as important to the local Muslim community, but very few candidates
considered the possibility of the mosque (or Islam) making a positive contribution to
the broader society. Besides identifying the key discourses, we reflect on them from
a religious literacy perspective.
Keywords Finland · Helsinki · Religious literacy · Discourse · Election · Islam ·
Mosque
1 Introduction
The sociologist of religion Grace Davie has written about the factors that should be
taken into account when talking about religion in present-day Europe. These factors
include, among others, the role that Christianity has played—and still plays—in
European societies, immigration to Europe from different parts of the world (which
has shaped—and still shapes—the religious field of the continent), and the growing
realization that regarding religions and religiosity, Europe is not the model that the
rest of the world follows. In particular, Muslims challenge the traditional ideas,
models and customs of Europe, even by their mere presence. (Davie and Dinham
2019, 17–22.)
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The number of Muslims in Western Europe has grown rapidly since the Second
WorldWar, and in many European countries Islam is now the second largest religion.
This change has sparkedmany political discussions and debates, many of which have
dealt with visible signs of Islamic faith in the predominantly Christian/secular Euro-
pean landscape. Two aspects in particular have aroused suspicions and opposition:
the use of hijabs and niqabs (Nilsson 2018; Konttori 2015; Brems 2014) and the
building and financing of mosques, including the training of the imams working
there (Hashas et al. 2018; Allievi 2009; Cesari 2005).
The discussions and debates concerning Islam and Muslims have varied in their
intensity from country to country, but nevertheless they exist in most Western Euro-
pean countries in one form or another. Finland is no exception. While a small Tatar
community has been living in the country for more than a century, and controversies
and debates rarely concern them in any way, the majority of Muslims in Finland
who immigrated from the early 1990s onwards have received much more attention
from themedia, politicians and ordinary citizens. Questions concerning headscarves,
niqabs, mosques, burial and butchery practices have been raised in Finland, but the
discussions have remained relatively calm.
Currently there are only two purpose-built mosque buildings in Finland. These
are situated in the small town of Järvenpää and in Helsinki, respectively, and belong
to the Tatars. In January 2015, a conglomerate of two Muslim organisations and
an interfaith dialogue group applied for land to build a “grand mosque” and cultural
centre in central Helsinki. The conglomerate wanted to keep themosque independent
of existingMuslim associations, and therefore it created a separate foundation named
Oasis to manage its affairs. (Pauha and Konttori 2019.) The Helsinki mosque project
was debated for several years, receiving a great deal of attention, at least in the capital
region.
One of the main issues during the mosque debate concerned foreign funding. The
organizers of the mosque project had negotiated with Bahrain, and there were fears
thatwith outsidemoney therewould also come foreign influence in relation to the type
of Islam practised in Finland. In addition, the estimated building costs of the mosque
were quite high, totalling over 100 million Euros, and the maintenance costs would
also have been considerable. These aspects led to astonishment and drew criticism.
Another issue was the representativeness of the mosque. It was supposed to be open
to all Muslims, but doubts arose whether in practice the Shi’a would be included.
Furthermore, not all Muslim communities active in Helsinki were supportive of the
project. (Pauha and Konttori 2019; see also Pauha and Martikainen 2017.)
In December 2017, the Urban Environment Division of the City of Helsinki pro-
posed that the Urban Environment committee accept the application and reserve a
plot for the mosque complex, albeit with conditions. Despite this, the committee
unanimously rejected the application in a meeting held the very next week. The
committee concluded that the application was untenable because “the scope of the
project and the still open questions and uncertainty factors, above all the origin of the
funding and the possible effects of the funding sources, do not provide a sustainable
foundation for this solution to be realized.” The mosque plan was scheduled to be
further discussed by the City Board of Helsinki, but after it was rejected by the Urban
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Environment committee, the applicants decided to withdraw the application. (Pauha
and Konttori 2019.)
In this chapter, we investigate comments made by electoral candidates in the
Helsinki City Council election in Spring 2017 and study how they argued either for or
against the mosque plan. The data consists of the responses given by the candidates
to a specific statement presented by the leading daily newspaper in Finland, the
Helsingin Sanomat: “It is possible to build a grand mosque for Helsinki if no city or
state money is spent on the project.” The candidates were asked to rate on a scale of
1–5whether they agreedwith the statement or not, with 1meaning “totally disagree”,
3 meaning “don’t know”, and 5 meaning “totally agree”. Altogether 848 candidates
gave their rating. The distribution of responses is shown in Table 1.
As can be seen in the last row of Table 1, approximately one third of the candidates
were at least somewhat opposed to the mosque project, while little over half were
in favour of it. Opposition to the mosque was strongest among the candidates of the
populist-nationalist Finns Party, centre-right National Coalition Party, Independence
Party (known for being Eurosceptic), and Christian Democrats, while the candidates
of all other parties were generally in favour of the project.
Besides giving numerical ratings, the candidates could justify their answers by
writing open responses. Altogether 630 out of 848 respondents chose to do so. In the
rest of this chapter, we focus on those 630 responses. We have coded their contents
in a bottom-up manner, that is, without a pre-existing coding scheme, using the
following questions as guidance: How are Islam in general and the mosque project
in particular represented in the data? How do the candidates understand religion and
its role in society? What are the blind spots regarding religion in their statements?
We identified several key discourses—ways of representing the issue at hand—
that underlie the responses. In the following we take a closer look at these discourses,
pointing out the main lines of argumentation as well as the rhetorical choices made
to strengthen the candidates’ arguments. In order to exemplify each discourse we
present several illustrative quotes from the data.
We reflect on the discourses from a religious literacy perspective. We understand
religious literacy in the vein of Moore (2007, p. 56) as “the ability to discern and
analyze the fundamental intersections of religion and social/political/cultural life
through multiple lenses”. We have chosen Moore’s approach to religious literacy
because of the emphasis that it places on complex interconnections between religious
and other aspects of social reality. As will be seen in the following pages, religion is
often perceived as problematic insofar as it intertwineswith politics. This is especially
the case with Islam; in public discussion, Islam is regularly portrayed as something
inextricably political, even to the extent of being “politics in religious disguise”.
Accordingly, many of the responses analysed here argue that religion and politics
need to be kept separate, or otherwise they will taint each other. Moore (2007, 2015),
however, thinks differently. For her, the intertwining of religion and politics is not
a problem in itself. Rather, it is just the way things are. Religion is always to some
extent political, and vice versa. Religious literacy is about discerning the subtle ways
in which religion intersects with other fields of human activity.
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Table 1 The distribution of responses (1 = “totally disagree”, 3 = “don’t know”, 5 = “totally
agree”) given to the statement: “It is possible to build a grand mosque to Helsinki, if no city or state
money is spent on the project.”
Party 1 2 3 4 5 Total
Social
Democratic
Party
11 (9.6%) 19
(16.5%)
17
(14.8%)
51
(44.3%)
17
(14.8%)
115
(100.0%)
Centre Party 4 (5.4%) 13
(17.6%)
6 (8.1%) 30
(40.5%)
21
(28.4%)
74
(100.0%)
National
Coalition
Party
21
(18.9%)
48
(43.2%)
6 (5.4%) 29
(26.1%)
7 (6.3%) 111
(100.0%)
Swedish
People’s
Party
1 (2.0%) 8 (16.3%) 5 (8.2%) 29
(59.2%)
7 (14.3%) 49
(100.0%)
Christian
Democrats
39
(54.9%)
15
(21.1%)
6 (8.5%) 9 (12.7%) 2 (2.8%) 71
(100.0%)
Green
League
1 (0.8%) 9 (7.3%) 13
(10.6%)
65
(52.8%)
35
(28.5%)
123
(100.0%)
Left Alliance 5 (4.8%) 9 (8.6%) 10 (9.5%) 56
(53.3%)
25
(23.8%)
105
(100.0%)
Finns Party 62
(72.1%)
10
(11.6%)
3 (3.5%) 7 (8.1%) 4 (4.7%) 86
(100.0%)
Communist
Party
3 (8.1%) 4 (10.8%) 2 (5.4%) 15
(40.5%)
13
(35.1%)
37
(100.0%)
Liberal Party 0 (0.0%) 3 (20.0%) 2 (13.3%) 5 (33.3%) 5 (33.3%) 15
(100.0%)
Pirate Party 2 (8.3%) 2 (8.3%) 1 (4.2%) 7 (29.2%) 12
(50.0%)
24
(100.0%)
Feminist
Party
1 (4.3%) 6 (26.1%) 0 (0.0%) 14
(60.9%)
2 (8.7%) 23
(100.0%)
Independence
Party
4 (57.1%) 1 (14.3%) 1 (14.3%) 1 (14.3%) 0 (0.0%) 7 (100.0%)
Othera 2 (25.0%) 1 (12.5%) 0 (0.0%) 3 (37.5%) 2 (25.0%) 8 (100.0%)
Total 156
(18.4%)
148
(17.5%)
71 (8.4%) 321
(37.9%)
152
(17.9%)
848
(100.0%)
aThe “Other” category includes independent candidates and parties with three or fewer candidates
(e.g. the Animal Justice Party and Communist Workers’ Party)
Moore (2015) advocates a cultural studies approach as an antidote to diminishing
religious literacy. According to her, such an approach entails, for example, three
central claims with regard to religion: first, religions are not monolithic but internally
diverse; secondly, religions are not static but evolving and changing; and lastly,
religions do not function in an isolated “religious” sphere but influence all aspects
of culture. As we will demonstrate in the following pages, these three claims can
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provide a valuable corrective to the blind spots demonstrated by the comments of
the electoral candidates.
We argue that even in a secular country, politicians need to have knowledge
about religions in order to be able to make fact-based decisions on issues related to
religions and religious communities. Questions regarding religious literacy do not
concern only Islam, but they still often have something to do with it, especially in
contemporary Western Europe, where the number of Muslims and the significance
of Islam have grown rapidly.
2 Domestic Christianity, Foreign Islam
The first hegemonic discourse that we identified in our data constructs a juxtaposition
between Christianity and Islam, with the former as something Finnish while the latter
is not. Several of the responses mentioned conflicts that would supposedly be caused
by the mosque. These conflicts were typically portrayed as imported from abroad.
The general idea appeared to be that foreign funding would be accompanied by a
radical agenda that in some unspecified way might permeate into the Finnish Mus-
lim community. The idea that radicalism could develop inside the Finnish Muslim
community without foreign involvement was not taken into account. Both of these
ideas held religious ideologies and communities to be static: if the foreign funder
had some sort of an agenda, it would simply be transferred to Finland, and Muslims
in the country would accept it without any critical thinking.
On the other hand, the transfer of the conservative thoughts of the foreign funders to the
Finnish Muslim population causes threatening visions. (Male, Liberal Party, 4)1
No Saudi money for Helsinki. It does not come free of charge. Elsewhere radicalization has
been significant in mosques funded by Saudi Arabia. (Male, Finns Party, 1)
In the latter statement, it is noted (with no further specification) that funding of a
mosque bySaudiArabia has led to radicalization “elsewhere”. This is one of themany
examples of how the Helsinki mosque debate was transnational by nature. Several
respondents referred to experiences in other countries, and thus the debate was never
only about Helsinki and Finland. Quite obviously, this also has a lot to dowith the fact
that the funding of the mosque was coming from abroad. The transnational aspect
of the debate will be discussed further on.
Another thing to note is the vagueness of the statement. The respondent does not
give any indication of which countries or mosques he is referring to. The statement
gives the impression that the respondent has studied the issue, as he is referring
to previous mosque projects, but the vagueness actually takes a lot of credibility
away. While it is true that foreign funding and influence over European Muslims
has had effects in the European context (see, e.g., Rohe 2019), it would be too
1The number in parentheses refers to the numerical rating (1= “totally disagree”, 3= “don’t know”,
5 = “totally agree”) given to the statement: “It is possible to build a grand mosque to Helsinki, if
no city or state money is spent on the project.”
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much to claim that all of the Saudi-funded mosques in Europe are extremist or
radical actors (Inge 2016, 28–29). The word “elsewhere” in the statement gives the
impression that Saudi funding and radicalization go hand in hand. Also, and quite
interestingly, in statementswhich bring up the threat of radicalization in Finland there
is no specification of who would bring that radicalization. One possible actor could
be imams. Whether imams should be trained in Europe or, for example, in Saudi
Arabia has been debated and investigated in many European countries (Hashas et al.
2018), Finland included (Martikainen and Latvio 2018). It is somewhat surprising
that imams were only rarely mentioned in the data.
The fear of radicalization being brought from abroad is evident in the following
statement as well:
As far as we know, the funding would come from actors supportive of the ultraconservative
Salafi branch of Islam, which might further the spread of radical thought in Finland. (Male,
Liberal Party, 2)
Why was radicalization perceived solely as a threat from abroad? Arguably, this
may demonstrate the extent to which popular conceptions of Islam are based on
media coverage. Raittila and Maasilta (2008) have noted that when discussing Islam
in other countries, Finnish newspapers have a strong tendency to associate it with
terrorism and political violence. However, the same kind of association is not made
in newspaper stories that are about Islam and Muslims in Finland. When Finnish
Muslims are described as being involved in conflicts, the conflicts are between Islamic
religious practices and the Finnish legislation, and not violent in nature. (Raittila and
Maasilta 2008.)
The statement above also mentions “the ultraconservative Salafi branch of Islam”,
linking it to “radical thought”. As Inge (2016) has noted, Salafism is often assumed
to be both a political and (potentially) violent movement, even though the opposite
is often the truth. Here, religious illiteracy appears to manifest itself in the form of
a lack of knowledge. Inge conducted her research on Salafi women in London and
Birmingham, and she notes that all of the Salafi communities that she got to know
during her fieldwork were categorically against both political action and violence.
We cannot know for sure what the candidate of the Liberal Party meant by “radical
thought”, but at least some connection with either political or violent action can be
assumed.
All in all, it remains unclear whether the candidates were primarily worried
about violent extremism or anti-liberal values, because they associated the mosque
project (with little elaboration) with both. However, as Moore (2015) has empha-
sized, religious literacy involves an awareness of the internal diversity of religious
traditions. It is necessary, for example, to acknowledge the distinction between
religious conservatism and religiously motivated violence. Conservative religious
groups, both Islamic and otherwise, can be opposed to issues such as gender equality
and democracy, without this translating into violent extremist action.
Besides the potential for conflicts associated with the mosque, Islam in general
was often portrayed as foreign and Christianity as the religion of Finland. It appears
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that a large mosque was seen to be too dominant in the Christian environment and
culture, according to the respondents.
Finland is still a Christian country. (Female, Christian Democrats, 1)
A grand mosque does not fit into the Finnish culture and our way of life. (Male, National
Coalition Party, 1)
Finland is a Christian country. It is not allowed to build large Christian churches in any
Muslim country, and in many cases not any kind of Christian shrine is allowed. (Male,
Social Democratic Party, 1)
The transnational nature of the debate is again visible in the statement in which
it is pointed out that Christians are not allowed to build large churches in Muslim
countries. This statement implicitly suggests that if Christians are not allowed to
build churches in Muslim countries, then Muslims should not be allowed to build a
grand mosque in a Christian country.
The idea of the foreignness of Islam was often conveyed implicitly by unques-
tioningly assuming that Muslims in Finland are immigrants. An example of this is
the following excerpt, which refers to the “home country” of the Muslims. While it
remains unclear what the country in question is, the choice of words shows that it is
certainly not Finland.
I do not think that the Shias and the Sunnis would be able to practise their religion in the
same mosque, as they are not able to do that even in their home country. (Female, Christian
Democrats, 1)
As demonstrated by the examples above, many of the respondents consider Fin-
land to be a “Christian country” or “Christian state”. This is in linewithDavie’s point,
presented earlier, on the significance of Christian heritage in Europe. Coming from
an election candidate, the notion of the Finnish state as “Christian” is problematic
because, at least in the legal sense, it is untrue; despite granting special judicial status
to the Evangelical Lutheran Church and Orthodox Church, Finland has no official
religion, and the state is confessionally neutral (Kääriäinen 2011; Sorsa 2015). How-
ever, as discussed in Pauha (2018) and Pauha and Jasinskaja-Lahti (2013), the public
representations of Finnishness are still very much intertwined with Christianity; this
may maintain the idea of a homogeneously Christian state and, as a result, exclude
religious minorities from perceptions of true Finnishness.
The notion of the Finnish state as “Christian” is especially noteworthy, as it comes
from candidates wishing to represent the capital of Finland. As in many other Euro-
pean countries, (Muslim) immigrants to Finland tend to live in the biggest cities.
Accordingly, Helsinki is probably the most multicultural city in Finland, and its
inhabitants confess an array of different faiths. In this context, the emphasis put
on a “Christian” Finland may represent an ideal held by a candidate, but it hardly
reflects the multireligious reality in the city, in which approximately one half of the
inhabitants are not members of the majority church (Helsingin seurakuntayhtymä
2018).
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3 Contested Boundaries of Religion
A particularly prominent discourse concerned the freedom of religion and its limits.
Regardless of party affiliation, candidates emphasized the necessity for religious
freedom and the equal treatment of all religions by the state. In the very next instant,
however, they often gave reasons for restricting these rights in the case of theHelsinki
mosque project. Frequently used were statements in the vein of “there is freedom of
religion in Finland, but…” Examples of this discourse include:
In the name of freedom of religion, it is of course allowed to build shrines of different
religions in Helsinki, but on the basis of existing knowledge, I do not support this project.
(Male, Green League, 2)
People of all religious denominations need to have their place in Helsinki for religious
practice, but there have been bad experiences of grand mosques elsewhere in the world.
(Female, National Coalition Party, 1)
In the statement above, the mosque debate is once again linked to previous expe-
riences “elsewhere in the world”, and thus the transnational aspect of the debate is
brought up. And again, the statement includes a vague reference to somewhere else in
the world. This vagueness makes it impossible for the voters, or researchers for that
matter, to check the claim concerning bad experiences in relation to grand mosques.
This is apparent in the following statement as well, where the respondent does not
refer only to “bad experiences” but also to hate and terrorism. Again, it is impossible
to know which cases the respondent is referring to. Positive examples from “else-
where” are conspicuously absent. Religious literacy, as understood byMoore, would
require that the heterogeneity of Muslim communities and their mosques receive
attention. Here Islam and grand mosques are presented only in a problem-oriented
manner.
Every religion has the right to have a place where to worship their God. But mosques in other
countries have been used to instigate hate and to support terrorism. (Male, Finns Party, 2)
The statements were often very general and abstract with regard to religious
freedom. A few candidates even quoted directly from the European Convention on
Human Rights or similar treaties. It is not far-fetched to interpret this as an electoral
tactic: bymaking declarations in support of religious freedom, the election candidates
could signal their commitment to general democratic values.
Upon close reading of the statements, it appears that many of the candidates were
operating on the implicit assumption that true religion excludes politics. Accordingly,
the mosque project was perceived as problematic because it was considered to be
political instead of religious—or even political in religious disguise. Some examples
include:
The grand mosque is more of a political project than a possibility to practise religion. (Male,
Left Alliance, 1)
Islam is not a religion, but a conservative political ideology. (Female, Finns Party, 1)
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As van der Veer (1996) has illustrated, the idea of true religion as antithetical
to politics is the product of Western Enlightenment thought, which restricted the
role of religion to the private sphere. True religion, as it is understood in the post-
Enlightenment West, is about harmony and goodwill, whereas politics is about divi-
sion and conflict (van der Veer 1996; see Pauha 2017). Similar views on religion are
conveyed, for example, in the following excerpts:
The core message of all true religions is the same, namely, the equality of and brotherly
love among all people. However, the mosque that is planned for Helsinki would represent
Wahhabism, disguised as Islam. (Male, Independence Party, 1)
In this project religion and politics seem to intertwine, and that might put a strain on relations
between Muslims representing different denominations. (Female, Green League, 4)
It needs to be ensured that the rationally selected location is for practising one’s religion, not
for agitating people. (Male, Finns Party, 4)
That Islam is considered to be “political” instead of purely religious is a relatively
widespread discourse in contemporary Europe. From a religious literacy perspec-
tive, however, such a strict demarcation between religion and other fields of human
activity is questionable. Moore (2015, 31) emphasizes that religious literacy involves
understanding religion “in context and as inextricably woven into all dimensions of
human experience” (italics in the original). A religiously literate person is able to
look past popular preconceptions about certain religious traditions or religion in gen-
eral and perceive the complex interconnections between religion and other facets of
human culture. In addition, the claim that the mosque “would represent Wahhabism,
disguised as Islam”, suggests thatWahhabism is not Islam. This is factually incorrect.
Furthermore, as scholars such as Taira (2010, 2013) have argued, religion is not a
clearly bounded entity to be found in the social world but a classificatory device that
can be applied to any number of things in order to advance goals related to them.
With the status of religion come certain (both official and unofficial) privileges and
burdens. The demarcation of religion is therefore inextricably tied to issues of power
and dominance.
Definitions can be used as tools for the governance of religion. The choice of
one definition over others may be used to legitimize religious restrictions without
appearing to violate the freedom of religion. As we have discussed above, a number
of electoral candidates emphasized their commitment to religious freedom while at
the same time opposing the proposed mosque. Such a rhetorical move was easier,
of course, if the mosque could be placed outside the boundaries of religion. The
same strategy has also been used, for example, in political debates in France on
headscarves and veils (Konttori 2015).
In contrast to those denying Islam the status of a religion, commentators with a
favourable attitude towards the proposed mosque tended to perceive it as a straight-
forward equivalent of a Christian church. A few of the statements even used the term
“church” in reference to a mosque.
I see mosques, just like churches, as places for practising one’s religion. (Male, Left
Alliance, 5)
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We do, after all, have churches representing other denominations as well. (Male, Left
Alliance, 4)
If we have a grand church [referring to Helsinki Cathedral], then why not a grand mosque?
(Male, Left Alliance, 4)
It is possible to build a grand mosque, just like the churches of all other religions. (Female,
National Coalition Party, 4)
One could question the term “Muslim church” by pointing out that, despite over-
lapping, the roles of a church and a mosque are not identical. Read in context, how-
ever, the choice of words here do not seem to imply a one-to-one correspondence
between the functions of the two buildings, but a very general idea of both being
houses of worship and therefore entitled to the same treatment.2
Besides perceiving the mosque as a “Muslim church”, the favourable commen-
tators tended to regard the activities of the mosque as internal affairs of the Muslim
community. The mosque plan was welcomed because Muslims were thought to need
it. A lack of space was perceived as the most pressing of their needs.
In a situation where there is a lack of prayer rooms and suitable locations for practising
religion, the grand mosque is an important project for the Muslim community. (Female, Left
Alliance, 5)
Reading the statements, one gets an impression of the Finnish Muslims as a more
or less insular community, whose needs do not intersect with those of the broader
society. In this case, the needs of the city are held as primary and the needs of the
local Muslims as secondary, if they are considered at all. In fact, several candidates
justified their numerical rating with a short comment: “Helsinki does not need a
grand mosque.” However, to quote Sicinius in Shakespeare’s Coriolanus (Act 3,
Scene 1), “What is the city but the people?” Whether the Muslims of Helsinki were
(implicitly or explicitly) included among the inhabitants of the city varied between
the responses. Perhaps not surprisingly, recognition of Muslims as inhabitants was
often associated with a positive attitude towards the mosque plan.
Muslims have the same right to practise their religion as all other people living in Helsinki.
(Female, Left Alliance, 5)
Everyone who lives in Helsinki, no matter their religion, has the right to practise religion in
suitable premises, so I support the building of a grand mosque. (Female, Feminist Party, 4)
In my opinion, the grand mosque should be built because it has a big influence on the daily
well-being of many people living in Helsinki. (Female, National Coalition Party, 4)
It [themosque] would not serve the interests of the people of Helsinki. (Male, Centre Party, 1)
However, even those candidates who explicitly included Muslims among the
inhabitants of Helsinki very seldom perceived overlaps between the needs of the
2It is also worth noting that mosques in Europe have adopted functions that are very different
from those of mosques in Muslim-majority countries but similar to those of European churches.
European mosques, for example, increasingly perform ceremonies such as weddings and funerals.
Allievi (2009, 21) refers to this as the “Christianization” of mosque functions.
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Muslim community and those of the broader society. Indeed, only a few commenta-
tors considered the possibility that it could be in the interests of the city and state if
the mosque was built. The few exceptions included the following:
With the help of a grand mosque, especially the young people with asylum status could
possibly be supported in their integration into Finland, and therefore it could be good for
Helsinki if implemented right. (Male, Centre Party, 4)
A grand mosque would enable dialogue between religions and, through that, increasing
understanding. (Female, Left Alliance, 5)
The mosque increases the value and diversity of the real estate. (Female, Left Alliance, 4)
It is important that an urban environment that is built in central locations be open and shared
by all. Hence, I hope that there will be, for example, suitable restaurants and other services
in connection with the mosque. (Male, Green League, 4)
Thus, to summarize, the candidates declared overall support for freedom of reli-
gion but were hesitant to apply it to the project at hand. Some candidates even
questioned whether the mosque project—or Islam, for that matter—is about religion
at all. Instead of being a site of religious practice, the mosque was perceived as a
political arena and channel through which foreign conflicts could seep into Finnish
society. The possible benefits of the mosque to the city as a whole were ignored by
all but a few respondents. In contrast, those favourable to the mosque plan tended to
emphasize the equivalence of a church to a mosque as well as the needs of the local
Muslim community.
4 Undefined Fears and Vague Worries
Sociologist of religion Allievi (2009, 60; 2014) has analysed European mosque
debates and noted that the resistance to mosques can be roughly divided into two
categories. On one hand, people are against mosque plans because of the concrete
effects that mosques are supposed to have—for example, property value decline,
noise, increased traffic, and violent crime. On the other hand, mosques are opposed
for cultural reasons, for example, because of perceiving Islamas oppressive towomen
or otherwise incompatible with European values.
Our data contained examples of both kinds of worries. Quite frequently, however,
the actual reasons for the opposition and suspicionwere not stated, and the candidates
only made vague references to general feelings of worry and concern. Usually the
vagueness appeared to stem from a lack of information, especially about the funding
sources, but it can also be asked whether at least some of these statements stem
from common stereotypes concerning Islam. Be it as it may, if we follow Dinham
and Jones (2010, 6), a religiously literate person acts based on knowledge, not on
stereotypes.
I feel suspicious about the construction of a grand mosque. (Male, Christian Democrats, 2)
Concerns are raised about the mosque funding that possibly comes from outside Finland.
(Female, Christian Democrats, 3)
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The project funding from Bahrain raises questions. (Male, Social Democratic Party, 1)
Funding concerns [me] a lot, too. (Male, National Coalition Party, 2)
At other times, vague statements seemed to imply an underlying presupposition of
shared knowledge. The candidates’ choice of words expressed confidence in readers
knowing beforehand about similarmosques in other countries and about the problems
caused by them. The impression was that candidates did not explicate their concerns
because they thought it was unnecessary, since readers would get the point.
For an electoral candidate, the avoidance of explicit accusations against Islammay
provide protection against being labelled a bigot. Only hinting at problems, instead
of naming them outright, allows for some leeway if one is called to answer for one’s
words.
Experiences from other countries are very bad. (Male, Finns Party, 1)
Experiences from elsewhere are not encouraging. (Male, National Coalition Party, 2)
Grand mosque plans have sadly turned out to be projects by the kind of actors whose aims
are not good for the traditional way of life of us Finns. (Male, National Coalition Party, 1)
As illustrated by some of the examples, the electoral candidates often made refer-
ences to bad experiences around mosques in other countries. Typically, however, the
mosques and countries in questionwere not specified.References to experiences from
other countries nevertheless illustrate the transnational aspects of mosque debates.
In particular, the arguments used against the building of mosques are often borrowed
fromother national contexts. (SeeAllievi 2009, 52–53.) Cautionary tales of extremist
mosques are circulated on discussion forums and shared on Facebook. Eventually the
tales become disconnected from their original context and turn into common folklore
among right-wing nationalists in Europe. Like fables and fairy tales, they are not set
in a specific time or place, but serve as a general warning about all mosques.
5 Conclusion
When quoting the candidates, we have included their party and gender. All in all,
however, such identities appeared to play a small role in the way that arguments for
or against the mosque were constructed. Similar arguments were used across party
lines, and where there were differences, they were of emphasis, not of kind. Christian
Democrats, for example, were especially keen to emphasize the Christian heritage of
Finland and the foreignness of Islam, but parallel views appeared in statements across
the political spectrum. Altogether, it appears that the discourses presented above are
common ways of discussing Islam and not limited to certain political stances. This
further supports the argument that the statements analysed here reflect not just the
views of individual Finnish politicians, but ideas that are relatively widespread in
Finnish society—or inEuropemore generally, as discussed in the previous paragraph.
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A key issue dividing the statements is whether Islam is just one religion among
many or whether it is a special case. Those favourable to the mosque tended to per-
ceive it as a “Muslim church” and therefore subject to the same laws and regulations
as any other house of worship. Those opposing the mosque, in turn, tended to treat
Islam as unique.3 Islam was perceived as a non-Finnish ideology that threatens to
import foreign conflicts into the country. Because of its association with conservative
social values and inegalitarianism, some commentators even denied Islam the status
of a religion. Such a perception of Islam is, of course, very one-sided and blind to
significant religious variation.
Even though themajority of the statements in the data do not explicitly promulgate
this kind of alienating discourse, they fail to provide a counter-discourse to it. Perhaps
the most typical stance taken in the data is that of “detached suspicion”, where
the affairs of the Muslim community are seen as being of little relevance to the
policymakers. In this case, the only reasons for city officials to be interested in the
wholemosque issue are their suspicions surrounding the funding sources and a desire
to reserve the same lot of land for some other purpose (for example, apartments).
Furthermore, very few statements mention the possibility of a mosque—or Muslims
in general—making a valuable contribution to society. This obviously constitutes an
additional blind spot in the mosque discussion.
From a religious literacy perspective, treating Islam as a special case is problem-
atic, but so is treating it as a faith like any other. Religious literacy involves the abil-
ity to discern both the similarities and differences between—and within—religions.
Therefore, simplified characterizations that either equate all religions or define them
through opposition should be avoided. Religions are better understood as “pools of
stories” (see Pauha and Jasinskaja-Lahti 2013) or as “baskets” (Hjärpe 1997), being
collections of disparate and often conflicting narratives, norms, beliefs, and rituals.
When crafting their religious identities, religious communities and individual believ-
ers choose some things from the basket and leave others. From this perspective, it is
fruitless to debate whether Islam is fundamentally a religion of peace or a religion
of war. The Islamic basket contains grounds for both interpretations. The mistake
made in many of the statements analysed here is in seeing only some contents of the
basket and confusing it with the basket as a whole.
What, then, could be done to correct some of the blind spots outlined in this paper?
Drawing on Moore’s (2015) approach to religious literacy, we would make four
suggestions. (1) Like Moore, we want to emphasise the internal diversity of religion.
This aspect is oftenmissing in the data. Davie’s repeated observation of “a lamentable
quality of conversation about religion” in Britain (Dinham 2015, 45) applies, at least
up to a certain point, to Finnish public discussions on Islam. Perceptions of Islam and
Muslims are all too often based onmedia images that tend to exaggerate violence and
terror. News from conflict zones provide a partial glimpse into Islam, but certainly not
3Other researchers have also noted (and critiqued) “the snare of exceptionalism” with regard to
Islam and mosques in Europe (Cesari 2005, 2007; see also Allievi 2009, 7–9). Instead of treating
Islam and Muslims as one religion or minority group among many, policymakers—and also some
academics—are prone to perceive them as an exception that needs to be considered separately from
other minority and religious issues.
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the whole truth (see also Francis et al. 2015, 128–129, onMuslims as a risk or threat).
Religious literacy involves a critical attitude towards one-sided media coverage and
preparedness to learn the “other side”. In fact, as Lövheim (2012) has pointed out,
there is a need for religious media literacy.
(2)Another key point raised byMoore is the changing nature of religion. Islam, for
example, has gone a longway frombeing “anArab religion” to being a collective noun
for a diverse set of traditions all around theworld. Islam is no longer a foreign religion
in Finland, and it should not be treated as such. It is important to be aware of the
transnational links between FinnishMuslims and theMiddle East, but the role of such
links should not be overstated. The relations between Finnish Muslim communities
in particular cannot be explained only in terms of Middle Eastern politics.
(3) For Moore, it is important to perceive religion as permeating all aspects of
social life. Religion is not, and cannot be, confined to its own separate domain. All
initiatives that propose a total exclusion of religion from the public sphere are there-
fore doomed from the start. Typically, such initiatives place increasing restrictions
on certain highly visible forms of religious practice, and at the same time turn a blind
eye to other ways in which religion influences public life. For instance, the singing of
hymns in school celebrations is often framed as a Finnish national tradition instead
of a religious one, and the singing of hymns is thus considered to be permissible
in school, even though the practice of religion in general is not. This, in turn, sup-
ports the hegemonic position of the dominant Lutheran Church (Taira 2019). A more
nuanced understanding of religion and its role in public life may contribute to a more
equal society.
(4) In a related vein, Muslims should not be perceived as an enclave isolated from
the surrounding city. Muslims are very much part of the city, and what affects the
Muslims affects the city. Furthermore, aside from being a Muslim house of worship,
a grand mosque is also an important urban landmark. As such, it has functions that
go beyond the religious. By organising training and social support, a grand mosque
can fill the gaps left by other service providers. It may also attract tourists, host
school visits, and serve as an information point for anyone interested in Islam. All
these functions should be considered alongside the potential security risks posed by
a grand mosque.
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